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PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE COMMISSIONERS'-ALL
INDUSTRY LAWS
HmERT C. BRoo* t
Three years, more or less, have now passed since practically every state enacted
insurance rate regulatory laws patterned after the Commissioners'--All Industry
bills.1 For three years, more or less, preceding that mass phenomenon there was a
period of intense feeling and activity on the part of the insurance industry and
state regulatory officials generated by the SEUA case.2 There has now been lapse
of enough time for some appraisal to be made of the operation and effect of these
laws and yet not sufficient lapse that they have acquired a settled place in the fabric
of our laws. Then too, during these three years there have been substantial changes
in the personnel of many insurance departments. The considerations that led their
predecessors to support such legislation may on sober second thought and in the
light of subsequent developments have lost some of their validity and certainly most
of their urgency. It would seem, therefore, that this is an opportune time to review
such laws from the point of view of whether they are in the public interest or
whether they do not stifle legitimate competition, hamper insurers in developing
new coverages, and add a wholly unjustified expense to the costs of doing business.
I
INsURANcE WAS ALREADY HIGHLY REGULATED
Before the passage of this rating legislation3 insurance already was one of the
most highly regulated industries in the American economy. There were detailed
laws in every state designed to protect the public against loss through the insolvency
of insurers. There were other laws dealing with the policy forms a company could
use. Long and extremely detailed annual statements covering the insurer's business
during the year and its year-end financial condition were required to be filed.
There were prohibitions against monopolies, discrimination, and rebating. Some
states had laws regulating rates. Most states provided for the licensing of insurance
brokers, agents, and other producers. And every state had an insurance department
to provide constant and extensive supervision over the the business of insurance.
This list is by no means complete, but it indicates the detail with which insurance
was regulated.
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1 For convenience, laws patterned on the Commissioners'-All Industry Model Fire and Casualty Rating
bills will be referred to herein as Commissioners'--All Industry laws.
'United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
'Every state passed rating legislation during the period 1945-1948. Most of the legislation was
passed in 1947.
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To the uninitiate, it must seem strange that with the business already so highly
regulated there should be any need to give the commissioners power over insurance
rates. To the same uninitiate, it must seem even stranger to learn that the giving
of such power at this time was not demanded by the public to eliminate some abuse
but was sought by powerful elements within the insurance industry itself. That
distinguishes this legislation from practically all that preceded it. The earlier
laws were passed because of some abuse to the public either actual or potential on
the part of the insurers sought to be reached by the regulation. Thus the reserve
requirements for life insurance were first passed in Massachusetts in 1858 at the
instance of Elizur Wright in order to prevent loss to policyholders because of the
maintenance of insufficient reserves by such companies.] The requirement that
standard fire policies be used was due in part at least to the unscrupulous practice of
companies loading their policies with restrictive provisions in fine print.' The
present requirements governing life policy provisions stem from abuses uncovered
by the Armstrong Investigation in New York in 19o5 and 1906," and in the same
manner the accident and health standard provisions were a result of abuses un-
covered in that state a few years later.7
But when the legislation in question was passed" the public was not threatened
with any abuse on the part of insurers. Indeed, as a result of the SEUA decision,9
the reason for passing much of the regulatory law in earlier years, namely, the need
to cope with combinations of companies fixing their rates in concert and engaging
in other monopolistic activities, was eliminated.
Prior to the SEUA decision there was no general sentiment among the states
that comprehensive insurance rating laws were necessary or desirable. A number
of states regulated in one degree or another rates for fire insurance, and a somewhat
lesser number had laws respecting the rates for such specialized lines as workmen's
compensation and automobile insurance. Only a few states such as New York and
Louisiana had laws regulating the rates generally of fire and casualty lines. The
New York law was passed in 1922 as a result of abuses found to exist there by a
legislative committee,1" but, as noted above, the practice did not spread to other
states. Nonetheless, within approximately three years after the SEUA decision,
almost every state, as a result of the efforts of two strong groups, had passed laws
regulating with great detail and strictness the rates for practically all lines of fire
nnd casualty business.
II
SPoNsoRs op Tm SRICr RAT REGULATORY LAws
The first of these groups was the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners. The commissioners naturally were jealous of the prerogatives and powers
' Founm ANNuAL REPORT OF Co0irilssIONERs 30-31 (Mass., 1859), reprinted in THE BIBLE OP LIFE
INSURANCE, AMERICAN CONSERVATION COMPANY (1932).
'ALBERT H. MOWBRAY, INSURANCE 67-68 (3rd ed. 1947).
' Id. at 175, 502-503. 'Id. at 503-504. See note 2 supra.
'322 U. S. 533 (1944)- " MowBRAY, op. dt. supra note 5, at 506.
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of their states over insurance, and the project of obtaining passage of strict rate
regulatorylaws had from the earliest been pitched on a "states'-rights" plane. The
one thing the commissioners wanted probably above all else was to have laws passed
which would have the greatest likelihood of keeping the Federal Government
completely and forever out of the insurance field. After the passage of Public Law
1511 on March 9, 1945 and the subsequent Robertson 2 and Benjamin"3 decisions
in June 1946, it seems obvious that there was little legal basis for apprehension as
to the future of state regulation of insurance.
The other group responsible for the passage of these laws was the All Industry
Committee. This Committee was organized in May i94514 and consisted of nineteen
members which are listed in the footnote.:" Without in anywise questioning their
sincerity, it may be helpful to the subsequent consideration of the Commissioners'--
All Industry laws to examine its membership briefly in the light of the interest of
the respective members in such legislation.
Of the nineteen members, six had no interest in the rating requirements of the
fire and casualty model bills because either the bills expressly exempted their lines
of insurance' 6 or they did not write fire or casualty business. 17  Of the four pro-
ducer organizations at least two were actively opposed to the rigor of the bills."
Of the remaining nine members, three represented participating insurers.19 It
is manifest that any legislation which would require or tend to establish uniformity
in rates would work to the advantage, at least for the short run, of insurers who
operate on the mutual or participating basis. Through their dividends they can,
in effect, underquote on any risk they deem desirable. While the proposed bills
provide in Section 3 that due consideration should, among other things, be given
2159 STAT. 33-34 (945), 15 U. S. C. §§IOXI-X015 (Supp. 1949).
"
2Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440 (946).
15Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946).
lThe Committee was organized at a joint meeting of the Federal Legislation Committee of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners and representatives of the insurance industry "to aid
in the formulation of a legislative program to strengthen existing state laws within the meaning of
Section 2b of the McCarran Act." Insurance as Interstate Commerce-The First 2 Years-nsurance
Section, American Bar Association.
" American Institute of Marine Underwriters; American Life Convention; American Mutual Alliance;
American Reciprocal Association; Associated Factory Mutual Fire Insurance Companies; Association of
Casualty and Surety Executives; Bureau of Personal Accident and Health Underwriters; Health and
Accident Underwriters Conference; Inland Marine Underwriters Association; Insurance Executives Asso-
ciation; Life Insurance Association of America; National Association of Casualty and Surety Agents;
National Association of Independent Insurers; National Association of Insurance Agents; National Associa-
tion of Insurance Brokers; National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents; National Board of Fire
Underwriters; National Fraternal Congress of America; Surety Association of America.
1" The model fire bill exempted among other things, marine insurance, and the casualty bill exempted,
among other things, accident and health insurance; hence American Institute of Marine Underwriters,
Bureau of Personal Accident and Health Underwriters, and Health and Accident Underwriters Conference
had no concern in the bills except to see that they retained these exemptions.
7 In this category are American Life Convention, Life Insurance Association of America, and National
Fraternal Congress of America.
"National Association of Insurance Brokers and National Association of Casualty and Surety Agents.
19 American Mutual Alliance, American Reciprocal Association, and Associated Factory Mutual In-
surance Companies.
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to "dividends, savings or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by in-
surers to their policyholders, members or subscribers," it is apparent that, as a
practical matter, the provision is essentially meaningless, because a participating
company can avoid its effect simply by becoming a subscriber to a rating bureau
instead of filing its own rates ° So long as independent insurers could freely estab-
lish rates to give due consideration to the relative hazards of the particular risk, a
mutual could not have this competitive advantage. But under the Commissioners'
-All Industry laws the mutual can use the rates and rating plans available to other
insurers, and in addition by virtue of its dividends underquote on any desirable piece
of business.2' Hence, at least from the short run point of view, the mutual
organizations could see a very real competitive advantage in sponsoring rate regu-
lation such as the model bills which would require all insurers to file rates.
"oSection 6(c) of the Model Bills provides as follows:
"No rating organization shall adopt any rule the effect of which would be to prohibit
or regulate the payment of dividends, savings or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed
or returned by insurers to their policyholders, members or subscribers."
'See address of John A. Diemand, Resistance to Change (Pamph., p. 2), given at White Sulphur
Springs, October 7, 194r:
Rating and anti-discriminatory laws, coupled with so-called scientific rating created
a condition under which stock companies could neither deviate nor legislate in their own
interest, but which left non-stock companies free to deviate through their dividends.
Realizing that they were free and that the stock companies were not, the non-stock com-
panies proceeded to invade industrial centers, first selecting only those risks known to be
profitable ...
"Let it be noted that these surpluses [of mutual companies] were nurtured by laws
which make bedfellows of mutual and stock companies in rate-making bodies and provide
for the development of a single rate level for both types of companies, which is at once high
enough to guarantee the dividends of mutual companies, yet inflexible enough to prevent
stock companies from competing on any risk of size and importance.
"But who raised a voice in protest? In fact, there is a suspicion that some of those
regulatory statutes were encouraged to prevent so-called unbridled competition on the part
of a minority of stock companies whose ideas of rating and policy forms differed from
the majority."
Address of Edward C. Stone, Public Law Z5: Its Purpose and Effect (Pamph., p. 9) given at Peoria,
Illinois, September 16, 1946:
"Now it so happens, as already pointed out, there are states that proceed along these
lines and do not make rates or require either prior approval or subsequent disapproval
of rates, but allow the fullest of competition as to rates. Such a state, for example,
is Rhode Island, and conditions in that state can easily be compared with conditions
in Massachusetts where workmen's compensation rates are subject to prior approval and
compulsory automobile liability rates are made by the Commissioner ...
"No better opportunity exists to compare conditions as to rates, on the one hand,
and opportunities for agents, on the other, than in these two states. The Providence, Rhode
Island agent or broker, with a customer in Providence or Pawtaucket, Rhode Island, can
compete with anyone, and his company is on an equal footing with any other, even the
mutual or participating companies, because rates may be quoted based upon competition,
and the public thus may get the benefit of competition as to price. If, for example,
competition is had between a stock company agent and the mutual direct writer that
ordinarily pays a 2o per cent dividend, the agent can, as to a Rhode Island risk, start
quoting, where the so-called manual rate is $i.oo, at $.8o. Not so, however with the
Massachusetts risk just across the State line. In Massachusetts, but one rate ordinarily is
available, to-wit, the prior approved rate. If this be, for example, $i.oo, the stock non-
participating carrier and its agents are in a strait-jacket. They can quote only the $x.oo
whereas the direct-writing mutual, obliged initially to charge the $r.oo, may pay its
dividend of $.2o, thus making its net rate $.8o and the agent can do nothing about it."
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Probably the National Association of Independent Insurers should also be placed
in this category since a majority of its members were participating carriers. Of the
remainder some belonged to rating bureaus and others regularly wrote at bureau
rates.2 Its membership either specialized in automobile insurance or wrote this
line exclusively so that it was not truly representative of the independent insurers of
the country.P
The remaining five members of the All Industry Committee represented the fire
and casualty companies, which for years had fixed their rates in concert. After
the SEUA decision it was necessary for such companies either (i) to change their
methods of operation and the operations of their various rating bureaus to conform
to what was permissible concerted action under the anti-trust laws,24 or (2) to induce
the various states to pass legislation permitting and regulating their concerted
activities.
The first alternative seems never to have been seriously considered. From the
time the Government appealed from the decision of the District Court sustaining a
demurrer to the indictment in the SEUA case' the fire organizations sought legis-
lation, first on the national level,26 and being unsuccessful there, then at the state
level, to permit them to continue their methods of doing business. Can anyone
seriously think that had Congress exempted insurance from the anti-trust laws that
they would then have been clamoring to strengthen the hands of the states in the
regulation of insurance rates?
The Commissioners'--All Industry laws do not deal with the coercive, intimi-
dative and boycott practices aimed at by the Justice Department in the SEUA prose-
cution, 2 but they do permit concert of action in rate fixing which would otherwise
'2 See BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS, CASUALTY, SURETY, AND MISCELLANEOUS (1946).
- Qrro PATTERSON, INSURANCE AT THE CROSSROAUs-THE MENACE OF THE ALL INDUSTRY BILLS I4-I5
(1947).
" See Maple Flooring Mfgr.'s Ass'n v. United States, 266 U. S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfgr.'s Protective
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925); see also Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 599 U. S. 40, 411-
412 0905).
sr 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
2"At their instance the Walter-Bailey-Van Nuys bill (H. R. 3270, H. R. 3269 and S. 1362) was
introduced in Congress in September 1943. The bill passed the House, but not the Senate, and it died
when Congress adjourned. The essential provision of this bill was:
"That nothing contained in the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sherman Act, or the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act,
shall be construed to apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct of that
business or in anywise to impair the regulation of that business by the several States."
"According to the opinion of the Supreme Court in the SEUA case (322 U. S. 533 at 535-536) the
indictment made the following charges:
"The member companies of S. E. U. A. controlled 90 per cent of the fire insurance
and 'allied lines' sold by stock fire insurance companies in the six states where the con-
spiracies were consummated. Both conspiracies consisted of a continuing agreement and
concert of action effectuated through S. E. U. A. The conspirators not only fixed premium
rates and agents' commissions, but employed boycotts together with other types of coercion
and intimidation to force non-member insurance companies into the conspiracies, and to
compel persons who needed insurance to buy only from S. E. U. A. members on S. E. U. A.
terms. Companies not members of S. E. U. A. were cut off from the opportunity to re-
insure their risks, and their services and facilities were disparaged; independent sales
agencies who defiantly represented non-S. E. U. A. companies were punished by a with-
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come within the condemnation of the Sherman Act. This may be desirable, but
the laws go further. They take in the entire industry-those who fix their rates
in concert as well as those who do not. What is the effect of this all-inclusive
scope? Does it not preserve for those who previously engaged in practices such as
those set forth in the SEUA indictment as much as possible of the existing set-up
with the blessing of the state? It is true that the state does not, in such rating
laws, sanction coercive, intimidative, or boycott practices. What was the purpose of
such practices? The obvious purpose was to destroy competition and to make the
entire industry conform to the standards of those acting in concert. What this
portion of the industry can no longer get by coercive, intimidative, and boycott
practices, it can achieve to the extent that the laws have the effect of destroying com-
petition, or even partially destroying existing competitive markets.
With the passage of this legislation the law relating to concerted action in in-
surance has made a full circle. In one generation, laws were passed to protect the
public from insurers fixing rates in concert;2" in this generation those same insurers
obtain the passage of laws to protect themselves from competitionl
III
EFFECT OF THE COMMISSIOoIERS'-Au. INDUSTRY LAWS UPON COMPETITION
The effect of the Commissioners'--All Industry laws in destroying competition
and stifling initiative and enterprise will be considered from the effect, (I) upon in-
dependent insurers, (2) upon bureau members, and (3) upon the public and in-
dustry generally.
A. Effect Upon Independent Insurers
Generally speaking competition in insurance can be expressed in terms of lower
rates, more satisfactory coverage, or service to the assured. Of these, only the third
is ordinarily available as among members of a rating bureau competing for the same
risk.aa But all three are available to an independent insurer in competing against
either a bureau member or another independent. Formerly it was not uncommon
that if a bureau company was in competition with a non-bureau company for a
particular risk, the bureau would, in effect, permit its member to meet price com-
petition by authorizing such lower premium as the company might think proper for
the risk.
When it became necessary for bureau companies to seek protection from the anti-
drawal of the right to represent the members of S. E. U. A.; and persons needing insurance
who purchased from non-S. E. U. A. companies were threatened with boycotts and
withdrawal of all patronage. The two conspiracies were effectively policed by inspection
and rating bureaus in five of the six states, together with local boards of insurance agents
in certain cities of all six states."
" See Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401 (1905); German Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Hale, 2i9 U. S. 307 (i9ii); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
29 Testimony of E. L. Williams at Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the
Indielary on S. r362, 7 8th Cong., Ist Ses. 324 ('943).
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trust laws through state legislation there were two choices available as to the handling
of bureau members: Laws could be passed permitting and regulating bureaus but
not requiring filings and not requiring bureau members to be bound by bureau
rates, or laws could require the filing and approval of bureau rates and require
members to be bound thereby. California adopted the first choice and the Com-
missioners'--All Industry laws represent the second. Under the latter laws, bureau
members obviously would be at a competitive disadvantage in situations such as the
above, and in order to eliminate their disadvantage these laws required that all
insurers must make filings.
It is not to be presumed that the bureau companies in meeting the competition
such as noted above obtained less premium than they thought adequate for that
particular risk. Scales of rates are prepared for the normal or standard risk. In
any classifications there likely will be risks the individual characteristics of which
make for either greater or lesser hazards than those contemplated in the standard
rate. The competition is for those involving lesser hazards, and there certainly is
nothing wrong for such risks to be charged less than the standard rates. Indeed,
strictly speaking, unjust discrimination results unless a lesser rate is charged. But
if the competitor is required to file a scale of rates, its scale should, as a practical
matter, conform generally to the rating scale in use by the majority of companies
writing that business, otherwise the scale will tend to develop an adverse selection
of risks. To illustrate, suppose an insurer, on the basis of its judgment and experi-
ence, prepares a scale based upon either a different rating basis or a different classi-
fication of risks than is in general use. The result will be a tendency for this insurer
to be offered those risks for which its rates are less than the rates of the other
insurers, and it will be offered few, if any, of the risks for which its rates are higher,
except those which have been declined by the other insurers. Consequently uni-
versal filings will cause all stales to tend to become uniform.
Another phase of competition which the Commissioners'--All Industry laws were
designed to eliminate was the ability which independent insurers formerly had of
providing coverages to meet exactly the needs of their assureds, as compared to
bureau companies which, in general, had to use standard bureau forms. This ability
to furnish "tailor-made" contracts was not only a great competitive advantage to
them, but it obviously was to the advantage of assureds. Not only could the insurer
make such changes in the usual policy to conform it to any unusual conditions in
the position or operation of the assured, but it could also combine in one contract
various coverages to give the assured full protection. In this way also new forms
of coverage were developed through experimentation. Independent insurers were
in a position to render a maximum service to the insuring public, and their freedom
to experiment assured progress and development of the industry. This flexibility
is effectually circumscribed in the laws in question since they require that rate
filings "shall indicate the character and extent of the coverage contemplated."30
'o See Kelly, New Trends in Insurance Regulation, AMERICAN MANAGEMENT Ass'N INSURANCE SERIES
No. 76, x6-17 (5948), in which the author in discussing the effects of the new rating legislation upon
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The net results of the foregoing so far as the independent insurer is concerned are:
(x) It will have lost much if not all of the competitive advantage it formerly had in
the matter of rates and forms; (2) it will have been put to great expense in making
individually the various filings required by the bills. So far as getting business is
concerned it will be in no better position under its filing than a bureau company,
and so far as expenses are concerned it will be much worse off. The indicated
course for it to follow is to join a bureau. This is undoubtedly what the industry
proponents intended when they sponsored the bills. But the question may be asked:
Who profits by this lack of flexibility-bureau companies or the insuring public?
B. Effect Upon Bureau Members
Proponents of the Commissioners'--All Industry laws are wont to point to Section
7 which provides for the filing of deviations by bureau members as showing there
is room for reasonable competition. Rather than having this effect, even a cursory
study of this section indicates that whatever was intended, in operation it will assure
bureau members a not too strenuous competition from other members. In the first
place, notice must be given to the bureau, and it is permitted to oppose the granting
of the deviation. In the second place, the general scale, having already been ap-
proved, will be presumptively correct, and the burden will be upon the applicant
to prove that the deviation is proper. Since the general scale will be deemed to
represent the best judgment of the experts in the bureau (as well as of the com-
missioner since he approved it) as to the proper rate, the applicant will have to be
able to produce figures which will establish either that its loss record or its expenses
vary sufficiently from the normal to justify the deviation. As against whatever
figures the applicant can produce, the bureau will in the usual case be able to produce
others which it has assembled so that the applicant faces a difficult, and in the usual
case, a discouraging if not impossible task. Finally, a deviation is effective only
for one year so that if a renewal is desired, the whole procedure must again be
followed.
Provisions substantially the same as these have been in existence for years in various
the operations of the Associated Factory Mutuals said:
"The most important change as far as the Factory Mutuals are concerned is that we
will have much less flexibility in our forms, rates and underwriting practices ...
"'In the past, when one of our insureds had an unusual problem, it was possible for
our underwriters to develop promptly a special form to meet his situation and to establish
a rate which they felt reasonable, adequate and non-discriminatory for the coverage desired.
Although this can still be done, it will of necessity take more time, since any form which
differs from those already on file must be submitted to the state insurance department
and any rate made for such form must be filed in accordance with the law. If the insurance
department feels that the rate proposed is unreasonable or is discriminatory, it may reject
the filing, whereupon the form must either be abandoned or the cumbersome procedure for
hearing an appeal must be followed ....
"The new law gives to every policyholder the assurance that he is receiving the same
treatment as avery other policyholder. In the case of the companies I represent, we never
felt that any such assurance was required. Our policyholders will have it now, nevertheless.
On the other hand, the tailor-made form and rate for an unusual situation, in which judg-
ment and sales ability on the part of both insurance company and policyholder are para-
mount factors, will not be as easy to secure."
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
states which had rate regulatory laws, and as a practical matter few deviations were
approved 1
The recent experience of the Insurance Company of North America in respect to
its application for a deviation in Pennsylvania will illustrate what a task the devia-
tion procedure may impose upon the applicant. The Company sought to reduce its
fire rates 15 per cent on certain classes of risks in certain territories on the ground
that it has effected economies in its commission arrangements which justified the
decrease. The deviation was granted,"' but subsequently a committee representing
over ioo other members of the rating association filed a complaint to have the ap-
proval rescinded. Extensive hearings were held, and as a result the commissioner
reduced the general scale of rates so as virtually to parallel the deviation which had
been granted. While the opposition to the deviation boomeranged in this in-
stance, it seems fairly obvious that the deviation route is a rugged and expensive
one for a company to travel.34 On this question of competition, the burdensome pro-
cedure for deviation in the Commissioners'--All Industry laws should be compared
with the provision in the California law which not only does not require any
formalities for a member to deviate from its bureau's rate, but on the contrary, pro-
hibits members from agreeing to be bound by such rates20 In this connection, the
Bulwinkle Act which was passed by Congress in 1948 may be of significance.
This law for the first time permitted railroads to fix rates in concert. However,
3 Belcher, Insurance Regulation and Free Enterprise, PROCEEDINGS OF INSURANCE LAW SECTION,
AmlucAN BAR Ass'z 23, 26 (1947)-
52 N. Y. Journal of Commerce, May 16, 1949, p. 12, col. 1.
SIThe general reduction was ordered October x, 1949, and the Commissioner held that this had
the effect of terminating the deviation. Subsequently an order was entered denying the complaint and
holding that the deviation was proper. The National Underwriter, July 20, 295o, p. 6, col. x.
" Former New York Superintendent of Insurance, Robert E. Dineen, in speaking at Syracuse, N. Y.,
May, 1950 explained the reason he considered and approved Aetna's output policy (discussed under
111 C) as a direct filing was because of the difficulties the company would have had getting the policy
through the various rating bureaus to which it belonged. As reported in Insurance Advocate, May 23,
1950, p. 17, col. x, Mr. Dineen said:
"We had had experience with experts in the art of dilatory tactics-men who could use the
parliamentary machinery of rating organizations as devices to delay their competitors from
introducing new forms of coverage and rate changes."
"CAL. INS. CoDE §853.6 (Supp. 1949); Missouri (for casualty insurance) (Mo. Rzv. STAT. ANN.
§6077 (i939)) and Montana (REv. Cons MoNT. 1948 §40.2404) have similar laws.
"
8 Of interest in this connection is the following comment from an address by James F. Crafts,
entitled The Challenge of the Future (Pamph., p. x5), given before Risk Research Institute, May 25, 1950:
"In our home state, [California] where there is considerable latitude granted to insurers,
it has been particularly interesting to compare the developments there during the past two
and one-half years with those in the remaining states, where the business is generally
operating under the so-called All-Industry statute.
"From a private enterprise point of view those who supported maximum control
legislation have found that they are faced to an increasing degree with the kind of super-
vision and direction which, I am sure, they had hoped to avoid. Independency of thought
and action is provided only through the filing of deviations, with the supporters and
opponents going through long drawn-out hearings in order to find the answer from a
supervisory official who seems to fully enjoy his policing authority. In California it can
be said that we have the opportunity to solve our problems, free of arbitrators, regardless
of how well qualified."
"62-SA. 472 (1948), 49 U. S. C. § 5b (1949). A provision to this effect must be specifically
included in any agreement See Western Traffic Ass'n-Agreement, 276 I.C.C. 183 (1949).
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it specifically prohibited any agreement among railroads which did not accord to
each party the right freely to take independent action at any time.
The only alternative to the cumbersome deviation procedure available to a mem-
ber (except to leave the bureau) who wants some change made in a filing or a new
filing made is to request the bureau to amend its rates or coverage or to make the
new filing. In such a case the bureau's internal procedure would, at best, entail
substantial delayYs If any member of the bureau objected to the proposal there
would be further delay, and if the opposition was strong enough the proposal would
be shelved. This is not said in spirit of criticism but solely to illustrate how under
the bills in question enforced adherence to a bureau's filings will delay and perhaps
prevent well founded changes desired by enterprising members3 9
C. Effect Upon the Public Generally
The general untoward effect of the Commissioners'-All Industry laws upon the
public and industry will be considered from the points of view: (I) tendency to
increase the difficulties poor risks will have in getting insurance, and (2) tendency
to cause uniformity in insurances with a consequent lessening of the scope for the
development of new coverages.
I. Difficulties imposed on poor risks
In subsection III A, the point was made that rating scales are drawn up for the
so-called standard or average risk so that in any classification there likely will be
some risks for which, because of individual characteristics, a greater or lesser rate
than the standard would be proper. In that subsection the advantage of a freely
competitive market to the better-than-average risk was pointed out. But a free
The following question and answer will illustrate this problem (Kelly, New Trends in Insurance
Regulation, AIERrMAN MANAGEMENT Ass'N INSURANCE SERiEs No. 76, 14, 19-20 (948)):
"QuEsToN: Can you change your filings?
"MR. KEL U.: Yes, we can. But, as I said, when you come to a change in filing, it starts
'running through channels.' Suppose you are dealing with a factory mutual-company. You
have a special or unusual clause in your form. You take this form up with them. You say,
'We sincerely hope you are going to be able to keep this form in effect.' The insurer
replies, 'We will take it up with the Forms Committee of the Factory Mutual Rating
Bureau.'
"Let us assume that the Forms Committee goes over it and agrees that it is an excellent
form which might well be written more widely. They ask the Rates Committee whether
any adjustment in rate is necessary for this form, and the Rates Committee studies it. That
means a further delay until the next Rates Committee meeting. They decide that your form
requires no additional rate; that the hazard has not increased; and that the Forms Commit-
tee has merely stated the problem more clearly so that you know more specifically what
coverage you have.
"Then the recommendations of the Forms and Rates Committees go to the board of
directors of the Rating Bureau, which approves them, and the filings are then made.
Assuming that there is no substantial element of controversy and that we are merely trying
to clear up what might be an ambiguity in a special case, let us suppose the filings are
all approved. Between the time we start our re-examination and the time we have the
approval of the state, there will be a minimum of three months' procedural time and I can
conceive of cases involving controversy where it could be six months or longer."
" Aside from this, the mere fact that when once a member has accomplished its purpose of getting
the proposed change filed it will be equally available to the other members will not encourage the
member to make the struggle.
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market is also an advantage to the poorer-than-average risk. Such a risk may not be
acceptable to an insurer at standard rates, but would be acceptable at an increase in
premium commensurate with the increases in its potential hazard. In the absence of
regulation imposed either by private or governmental authority, insurance will
respond to economic laws in the same manner as other commodities. An increase in
price will bring out an increase in the supply of insurance the same as it will for
other goods or services. Thus, in a free market an additional premium could be
charged for the below standard risk, and it could be placed. But in a market where
all insurers are bound by filed scales of rates, if the risk is not acceptable at standard
rates it will be difficult and perhaps impossible to place it.4° To meet this difficulty
the casualty bill contains a provision for assigned-risk pools.4' There is no corre-
sponding provision in the fire and marine bill, but at best this is not a very satis-
factory solution to the assured, and it results in another organization having to be
maintained.42 If there is no assigned-risk pool available such a risk must go un-
insured unless it can be placed under an Excess or Surplus Line law4" with an
insurer not authorized to do business in that state. In the usual case the reason it
can be placed with the non-authorized insurer and not in the authorized market
is because a higher premium can be paid the non-authorized insurer. If there is
a free market in the state so that insurers can charge additional premium for the
so-called substandard risks, much of these difficulties will be eliminated.
In the old days, life insurance tended to follow the rule that either a risk was
acceptable at standard rates or it was, to use the common expression, "uninsurable."
In recent years this attitude has been changing so that risks that once would have
been "uninsurable" will now be accepted at a higher than standard rate.44 It seems
anomalous that at the very time life insurance is getting out of the "uninsurable"
attitude this attitude will become stronger in the fire and casualty business when all
companies will be writing by the "book" because of the strict rating legislation. This
throttling of the ability of insurers freely to adjust their rates to the individual char-
acteristics of risks serves no useful purpose and will impose a definite hardship on
insureds.
2. Tendency to cause uniformity in insurances with consequent lessening of scope
for development of new coverages
It was also suggested in subsection III A that where all insurers are required to
"
0 The Commissioners'--All Industry laws contain an impractical section (4g) to the effect that a
rate higher than the filed rate can be used for a particular risk if the assured makes a written application
to the commissioner "stating his reasons therefor" and the commissioner approves the application. Some
commissioners also accept special filings not made on the application of the insured. The administrative
detail and expense in making any such special filings are obvious.
"Usually all insurers writing the particular kind of insurance will belong to the pool. Risks
which cannot obtain insurance through normal channels go into the pool and are assigned, on the basis
of some formula, to the respective members.
42 To the extent carriers must accept insurances under assigned risk plans at less than adequate rates,
the claimed purpose of the bills to maintain solvency is defeated or other risks must make up the
deficiency in rates.
'
3 E.g., ILL. REV. STATS. C. 73 §X057.
" Increases up to 500 per cent of normal mortality rating are now written. See The Weekly Under-
writer, April i, x95o, p. 80o, col. I.
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file rates there would be a natural tendency for such filings to be uniform, otherwise
an adverse selection of risks would develop. But aside from this, the administration
of the laws will encourage if not compel uniformity in rates. Needless to say, it
would simplify work in the commissioners' offices if there was a single scale of rates
for all risks and standardized forms for each coverage. And might a commissioner
not contend that if the laws are to provide any benefit to the public it must be by
assuring them of equitable rates; that so far as the public is concerned if the com-
missioner does his job in regulating rates the premium for an insurance should be
the same whether it was provided by one company or by another? While, so fai
as the language of the laws are concerned, different insurers may be entitled to
charge different rates for the same coverage, it is doubtful if a layman would be able
to understand what useful function the commissioner served in that situation. Then
too, an insurer might question why it should be limited to a lesser rate than another
company simply because the expenses of the latter were higher. If, by reason of
economies in its operations, the expenses of one company are less than the expenses
of another, why should not the first, if it so desires, retain the benefit of its superior
management by enjoying a greater margin of profit than the second. The cost to
the public will be the same. As a result of considerations such as these, it seems
inevitable that the tendency will be for commissioners to work toward uniform
rates4r which will of necessity give some effect to the expenses of the least efficient
insurer.48
With a standardization of rates and of forms there will be little if any incentive
and less scope for the development of new coverages or the combinations of old to
simplify and reduce rates. The public will then have no choice but to accept what
the commissioner has seen fit to approve or go uninsured.47 The strict filing re-
quirements of the Commissioners'--All Industry laws have already caused consider-
able hardship to assureds in preventing them from obtaining coverages to fit their
exact needs s
"
5 The defendants in their brief filed in the Supreme Court in the SEUA case very fiankly a'dmitted
(at pages 34 and 49) that both the purpose and effect of state rating laws were to secure uniformity in
rates.
"'See Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F. 2d 281, 293 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
'7 Situations such as the one now obtaining in Texas in respect to windstorm and hail insurance
will tend to become the rule. The Texas Board of Insurance Commissioners in 1946 ruled that all
such insurances must be written on the basis of a $zoo deductible. An assured sought to have the
order set aside so that he could buy full coverage, but was unsuccessful. (Board of Ins. Comm'rs v.
Carter, 228 S. W. 2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)); The National Underwriter, p. i, col. 2, March 9,
1950. This sort of a mandatory ruling is just as absurd as would be one by a commissioner that
men's trousers could reach only to the knees. Certainly there is nothing immoral about full coverage
windstorm insurance. If a person wants to pay the additional premium and there are companies willing
to write it, he should be able to satisfy his wants.
48 See comments of H. E. Goodell, President of Risk Research Institute, on February 23, 1950, as
reported in The Eastern Underwriter, March 3, 1950, p. r, col. i, as follows:
"Referring to the preliminary discussions by a small group of buyers in Chicago, Decem-
ber 14, 1949, looking toward a national organization, Mr. Goodell said that the initiators
of this conference 'have watched with growing concern the restricting insurance coverage
under prescribed policy forms and the increasing use of non-competitive rates.'
"'It is their belief,' he continued, 'that no insurable and ratable risk should go un-
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There is currently much interest in multiple line insurances and most states have
within recent years amended their laws to permit more extensive multiple line under-
writing. This will make it possible for companies to give broader protection in
single policies, but in a measure the passage of the strict rating laws frustrates the
efforts of companies to utilize their broader powers. Even if a company does not
belong to a bureau and is therefore spared the effort necessary to persuade the other
members that a new plan has merit and should be filed, the company faces a big
task in getting a new plan of insurance approved by the commissioners. If it should
involve several classes of insurance, it will in the usual case have to be considered by
more than one division in the commissioners' offices. Usually the rating plan for
combination and package policies will develop a lesser premium than will the rating
plans filed by the company for each element if written separately. The amount of
the discount for the combination of coverages will be a matter of judgment, and the
probabilities are that somewhere along the line some official will want to substitute
his judgment for that of the company. In any event, the filing process will involve
time and expense even if it is limited to one state. If the company wants to use
it in other states, the problem will be magnified by at least as many times as the
number of states involved.
The efforts of Aetna Insurance Company to obtain approval of a newly developed
manufacturers' output policy are illustrative.40 This was a combination policy made
up of various fire, inland marine, and casualty coverages. A single-rate method was
adopted for rating the policy instead of building up a combination rate from the rates
for each coverage. Conversations were started with the New York department in
the fall of i948.' In December 1949 New York accepted the plan as a direct filing
and thereafter the company submitted it to various other states. As of May 195o
the filing had been approved by approximately twenty-five states and had been dis-
approved by seven."'
protected. The purpose of the meeting was to find some common ground on which buyers
of insurance throughout the country would unite to the end that they might secure the
full protection they need, at a fair price, written on adequate, simplified policy forms.'"
See also Kenney, Effect of State and Federal Regulation Upon the Insured, U. S. Investor, May 27, 1950,
P- 77-
" According to Bruce Gentry, Secretary of Aetna, the development of the policy as filed was
prompted by the following circumstances:
"The year was 1947, the period was the moratorium which has been granted the com-
panies by Congress to get their affairs re-shaped under the impact of the S. E. U. A. case.
"Like all companies, we were bringing up for review any unusual policies which had
been written prior to the tightening up of regulation and which must now be either can-
celled or reformed, or otherwise made to meet the requirements of more complete regu-
lation. Among these unusual contracts were four policies which our automobile department
had been writing for some years, called 'automobile output policies.' All were special
typewritten forms." The Weekly Underwriter, June 3, 1950, pp. 1290-1291, col. x.
"Insurance Advocate, May 13, 1950, p. 8, col. 2.
5" The reason for disapproval by Louisiana, as reported in The National Underwriter, March 23, 950,
p. 12, col. 4, is as follows:
"Commissioner Martin of Louisiana states that the plan was rejected at this time for
the reason there is not available, in the opinion of the department, sufficient statistical
data to justify the fixing of a rate which would be 'non-discriminatory, non-excessive, fair
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IV
THE FILING OF RATES ACCOMPLISHES LITLE IN INSURING
THAT RISKS ARE PROPERLY RATED
Theoretically, the whole complicated and restrictive procedure set up in the
Commissioners'--AUI Industry laws for the filing and approval of rates is to ensure
that the rates of an insurer are not "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discrimina-
tory.
The laws studiously avoid any definition of these terms so that, in the first in-
stance at least, their content will depend upon the attitude of the commissioner in
any particular situation. Such discretionary power would seem to be both improper
and unnecessary, but passing that objection, an analysis of the bills will show that
the strict requirements accomplish little or nothing in preventing inadequate or
unfairly discriminatory rates and actually will facilitate the charging of excessive
rates by combinations of insurers.
A. Excessiveness of Rates
The first standard to be observed in rate making is that the rates shall not be
"excessive." There is a public purpose here in view of the permission given by the
laws for companies to act in concert, but no rate regulatory laws of the scope of these
bills are necessary to protect the public from excessive rates. Excessiveness of rates
cannot be determined from a short-term view. An insurer engaging in a new line
of insurance must be given wide latitude in pitching its rates at such level as it
thinks necessary. The same is true for hazardous lines, or lines which have consist-
ently showed a worsening experience. If rates in the latter case can be increased only
to the extent indicated by the previous years' losses the insurer will never catch up
but will consistently lose money.52  Nor is there anything to fear in a free
economy in any such situation, because as soon as the business does become con-
sistently profitable other companies will come into the market. So long as there
is no monopoly, their competition will bring the rates down. It is, therefore,
only when insurers writing a line of business have or tend to have a price fixing
monopoly that the public can be made to suffer. In order to prevent or, if it exists,
to remedy any such situation, the best solution is to encourage the existence of inde-
pendent companies who will be in a position to compete. State supervision cannot
give adequate protection.
The Commissioners'--All Industry laws give the commissioner in fact, or
and reasonable' as contemplated by law and sound insurance rating."
It would seem that a fair query is why Aetna with its financial strength and background of insurance
knowledge should not be given the benefit of its judgment that the rating plan it adopted was "sound
insurance rating." Also, if the coverage cannot be written, when can the necessary "statistical data"
be obtained?
"' The real danger here is that increases in rates will not be made promptly either for political
reasons or simply because of administrative slowness. The result will be that insurers will drop out
of the market and others will become more selective so that assureds, in general, will be worse off
than in a free market where the insurers can immediately increase their rates.
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at least in effect, the power to fix rates.53 However, there probably exists some area
in which the judgment of the bureau or insurer can operate, particularly when the
question arises whether a rate already approved and in use should be decreased. In
such a situation unless the commissioner can demonstrate that the proper rate is
substantially below the lower limit of that judgment area, the bureau is probably
entitled to retain its high rate. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court, in Georgia
v. Pennsylvania RR.,54 held that the fixing of transportation rates by combinations
of carriers acting through rate bureaus was in violation of the anti-trust laws even
though such rates had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Whether or not intended so to operate, the Commissioners'-All Industry laws
inescapably tend to destroy the free play of competitive forces by subjecting inde-
pendent insurers to the same rigid filing requirements as companies acting in concert.
B. Inadequacy of Rates
The next standard is that rates shall not be inadequate. The argument runs
that in a free economy "cut-throat" competition 5 forces rates below the amount
necessary to carry the risk. Consequently, by strict regulation, adequacy of rates
will be assured and thereby also solvency. This argument, if it has any validity, is
much overdrawn.
In the first place there should be an understanding of what is meant by solvency
and also what is meant by inadequate rates. Certainly solvency does not mean that
a company once launched is entitled to remain in existence irrespective of the inept-
ness and lack of capacity on the part of its management 0 It is no worse for an ill-
' Belcher, Insurance Rate Regulation and Free Enterprise, PROCEEDINGS OF INSURANCtE SanaroX,
Aa AEnCAN BAR AssociAmT5o 23, 24-25 (1947).
rA324 U. S. 439 (1945). The Court said (pp. 46o-46i):
"The Keogh case indicates that even a combination to fix reasonable and non-dis-
criminatory rates may be illegal. 26o U. S. p. 161. The reason is that the Interstate
Commerce Act does not provide remedies for the correction of all the abuses of rate-making
which might constitute violations of anti-trust laws. Thus a 'zone of reasonableness exists
between maxima and minima within which a carrier is ordinarily free to adjust its charges
for itself.' United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499, 506. Within
that zone the Commission lacks power to grant relief even though the rates are raised
to the maxima by a conspiracy among carriers who employ unlawful tactics."
"The expression "cut-throat competition" is easy to use but hard to define. In many cases, on
close examination, it undoubtedly means no more than that the prices of a competitor are such that the
one complaining can no longer enjoy the same ease or margin of profit (whatever it may have been)
as formerly. For example, the complaining companies in the North America rate deviation controversy
discussed under III B contended that North America was attempting to gain an "unfair com-
petitive advantage" (The National Underwriter, July 20, 195o, p. 6, col. 3) which presumably is
equivalent to "cut-throat competition." In any event, since combinations of insurance companies are
permitted and since such combinations represent a large part of the insurance capacity of the country,
any danger of injury to the public or to the industry by "cut-throat competition," whatever that may mean,
seems rather remote.
"6 See Tom C. Clark (then United States Attorney General, now Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court), Insurance, Bulwark of Free Enterprise, Best's Fire and Casualty News, June
1947, p. 19, col. I.
"Freedom of enterprise means that new firms are free to enter an industry and that
old firms are free to leave it. It means that business stands on its own two feet and does
not lean for support on a governmental crutch. It means innovation, change, progress-
with no absolute guarantee of security. And finally, it means competition, with each firm
acting independently."
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managed insurance company to have to cease underwriting than for any other
business enterprise to have to close its doors. The thing that the various laws re-
lating to solvency attempt to accomplish is to ensure that the policyholders of a
company and those entitled to the benefits of its policies do not thereby suffer any
substantial loss, that is, that the company always have on hand enough assets so
that it can, at any time, pay its obligations on policies then outstanding. If this is
done and the company nevertheless gets into difficulties, it will be a comparatively
simple matter to reinsure its policy obligations so that when it must cease under-
writing there will be no loss under its policies. There are now extensive laws de-
signed to insure this condition, and if it is thought that they are insufficient the
remedy is to correct their deficiency by direct legislation, not to suppose that it can
be done indirectly through the supervision of rates."
Inadequate rates within the meaning of the Commissioners'--All Industry laws
cannot, as a practical matter, mean that the rate for each and every risk will be
adequate. As pointed out in subdivision III A, there likely will be risks in any rating
classification that involve above normal hazards and for which, as a matter of good
underwriting, a higher than standard rate should be received. If a company accepts
an undue proportion of such risks and is not able to compensate for the greater
exposure through expense economies, it will lose money. But is this anything a com-
missioner can prevent through rate supervision? To illustrate, a large New York
casualty company was found to be in financial difficulties in 1947. Fortunately it
was saved through loans totaling $8,oooooo from the Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration. According to Best's5" this company adhered to the rates and rules promul-
gated by the various rating bureaus to which it belonged. In addition a very large
share of its business was under state rate regulation. But, nonetheless, this significant
sentence appears in Bests report:
A considerable portion of the business in force at the end of 1946 had been written at
inadequate rates and a large amount of undesirable 59 business had been accepted.
" The suggestion might be made that the present system of permitting companies to prepare their
own annual statements with examinations by commissioners periodically, usually every three years,
is not adequate to detect difficulties before they become so serious as to result in loss to policyholders,
etc. A possible alternative would be to require annual statements to be audited by an insurance auditor
chosen from a panel approved by the commissioners. This auditor would have to certify that in his
opinion the company then had sufficient assets to meet all of its policy obligations. In this way, the
individual characteristics of the company could be taken into account, and if it was having a higher
than normal loss ratio or higher than normal expenses, this would be taken into account by the auditor
in reaching his conclusion. In the event the auditor and company disagreed then the commissioner
should immediately resolve the difference by an examination, if necessary. If this procedure was
followed, any tendency towards insolvency due to the collection of insufficient premiums to pay losses
plus expenses, whatever the latter may be, would be detected before real harm to the public could be
done. At the same time, a company which charged low rates but which had lower than average
expenses would not be penalized.
Inadequacy of rates in life insurance is largely prevented by statutory reserve requirements. (MowaRAY,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 375; EDWIN NV. PATrtERsoN, ThE INsusRANcE COMMISSIONERt IN THE UNITED STATES
270, 283 (1927).
:8 BEsr's INsuRANcE REPoRTs, CAsuALTY, SuRETY AND MIscELLANEOUs 337 (1948).
SThe question might be asked, why was the business undesirable? Was it because of bad moral
hazards or simply because the risks were such that a much larger than standard premium should have
been charged? Presumably most, if not all, would fall in the latter category.
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Can anyone seriously think that if all the states then had rate regulatory laws
such as the Commissioners'--All Industry laws the difficulties of this company would
have been averted?
In the second place, and as a matter of history, those states which have attempted
to supervise rates have been primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with the pre-
vention of exorbitant rates.60 The genesis of rating legislation was the belief that
the combinations of fire insurers were charging excessive rates. While some
statutes such as the original one in Kansas81 gave the Superintendent authority to
compel the raising of rates, it probably is a fair surmise that this power was given
primarily to prevent discrimination and the freezing out of competitors rather than
to protect the solvency of the insurers6 2
Inquiry of those in a position to know the cause, or causes, of the various failures
of insurance companies in Illinois during the early Thirties discloses that those fail-
ures were due to investments becoming valueless, improper management including
excessive salaries, and improper claim handling. In none could the failure be
attributed to the charging of below market rates!'
In sharp contrast to the lack of evidence tending to show that supervision of rates
will prevent insolvency is the evidence that rate supervision not only does not pre-
vent the charging of inadequate rates, but actually may cause inadequate rates to be
charged. The difficulties of the New York company mentioned above is an example,
since a very large part, if not most, of its insurances were under state regulation.
There is evidence that on at least one occasion automobile insurance rates fixed
by the Commissioner of Massachusetts were so inadequate that several companies
became insolvent. 4
That state supervision of rates is no guarantee that adequate rates will be charged
is illustrated in the following table.65
"It is stated in the brief filed in the Supreme Court by the Appellees in the SEUA case that twenty-
nine states had laws relating to fire insurance rates (pp. 51, 52) of which six gave the commissioner
authority to compel increases in rates. (p. 56.)
"
1See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 390-393 (1913).
"
2Immediately upon passage of the Kansas law the Superintendent reduced fire rates 12 per cent.
Id. at 397.
03 See MowBaAY, op. 'it. supra note 5, at 458, in which the author states on the basis of analysis of
individual cases of loss to policyholders due to life company insolvencies that the principal causes of
loss were dishonesty in management, incompetence in the investment of funds, failure to set up proper
reserves, and failure of state officials to act when the company was found in difficulties.
e' Stone, supra, note zi:
"Incidentally, it may be observed that the mutual liability companies formed in
Massachusetts to write compulsory automobile liability policies, which companies later
became insolvent, blamed their downfall and the consequent injury to the public (in the
way of policyholder and injured claimant under the policies) on the inadequate rate made
by the Commissionerl Thus, even rates made by commissioners may turn out to be in-
adequate."
"SInsurance Advocate, July 22, 1950, p. 1o.
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AUTOMOBILE BODILY INjURY LIABILITY AGGREGATEs (STOcK COMPANIES)
COUNTRYWIDE NEW YoRK STATE
Year Earned Losses In- Expenses Premiums Losses in-
Net Premiums curred to Earned curred to
Premiums Premiums
Earned Earned
1945 $200,161,551 564% 47.2% $37,584,571 63.1%
1946 261,388,3o8 64.4 47.8 50,907,193 70.9
1947 347,455,921 55.4 45.8 69,541,725 63.6
1948 416,951,566 52.0 44.4 86,104,527 6o.6
1949 473,938,918 48-3 44.1 103,468,916 54.3
Is it any wonder that the New York company mentioned above got into financial
difficulties? And yet it has been generally agreed that if any state was equipped
to administer properly the laws patterned on the Commissioners'-All Industry bills
it was New York. This state has had general rating laws since 1922, and in many
respects the Commissioners'-All Industry laws followed a New York law passed in
1939.
Finally, it is to be noted that not only do the Commissioners'-All Industry laws
not give the commissioners specific power to regulate acquisition costs or other ex-
penses, but it was agreed by the commissioners and the All Industry Committee
that the model bills did not give the commissioners any such power.66 It is just as
easy for a company to become insolvent by excessive expense outlays as by the col-
lection of inadequate premiums. In some lines, as for instance fire insurance on
dwellings, there has been more tendency to compete for such business by acquiring
more and more desirable agents by increasing commission allowances than by re-
ducing rates.0 7 In making this reference, it is not to be understood that the writer
advocates state regulation of such expenses. It is mentioned only to illustrate that
for still another reason the contentions of the proponents of the Commissioners'-All
Industry laws that strict regulation of rates was necessary to prevent insolvency are
unsound. They knew this possibility for competition existed. And, if one might
hazard an opinion, if these strict rate regulatory laws remain on the books it will
be only a question of time before the commissioners seek legislation to control acquisi-
tion costs, for the reason, if for no other, that such authority is necessary for them
to perform their duty adequately under the rating laws.
C. Unfair Discrimination in Rates
The third standard is that rates shall not be unfairly discriminatory. Before the
rating legislation many states had anti-discrimination laws in one form or another,
and until the SEUA decision they appeared to have been adequate and to have given
satisfaction. All that the commissioners under the rating laws can do that has not
heretofore been accomplished is to consider whether a rating plan or rating scale
"Elmer Warren Sawyer, Can We Audit the Past in Terms of the Future (Pamph., p. 12), address
given at Ohio State University, March 21, 1949.
"See Dineen, Acquisition Cost Conferences-949 Developments, INs. L. J. 269, 274 (April X949);
The National Underwriter, August "5, 1949, p. 8, col. x.
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shows on its face that it is discriminatory. But unfair discrimination, if there is any,
will in the usual case not appear in the construction of the plan or scale but in its
applicationYs The present laws can add nothing to those already on the books in de-
tecting this situation.
As against any advantages to the public that can accrue in this respect from
the rating laws, there are certain disadvantages. As heretofore pointed out, when
risks are classified for rating purposes the better-than-average risks in a classification
pay an unduly high premium, and the poorer-than-average risks pay less than they
should. This grouping for classification purposes is essential for rate filings, and
yet it of necessity makes for a certain amount of discrimination. To avoid an undue
amount of such discrimination, an insurer may attempt to construct a different
method for classifying or rating risks. In the usual case, the new method will
involve a substantial amount of underwriting judgment. In a free economy the
insurer could experiment, perhaps on a small scale, to perfect the system. But under
the present rating laws, he must file and have it approved before it can be used.
Not only will this involve time and expense, but the commissioner, on the basis of
his judgment, may decline to approve the method. 9 Thus the rating laws will tend
to freeze present classifications and prevent the development of new and improved
ones.
V
CoM:PARIsoN BETWEEN CALIFORNIA LAW AND THE
CoMMIssIoNERs'--ALL INDusTRY LAWs
It is not to be understood that the Commissioners'--All Industry laws were
passed without opposition, but except in a few states, notably California,70 the com-
bined strength of the commissioners and the organized mutuals and stock companies
acting as the All Industry Committee were sufficient to force the passage of the
legislation. There is a fundamental difference in philosophy between the Com-
missioners'--Al Industry laws and the California law. The philosophy of the
latter is that there should be a maximum of competition with the minimum of
regulation which will permit and yet regulate concerted action. 1 Prior to this
" See REPORT ON EXAMINATION OF NEw YORIC FIRE RATING ORGANIZATION BY STAVIs or NEw Yoasr
DEPA TMENT 15-16, 34-35 (October 1S, 1946), in which there are numerous examples of different rates
being established for the same risk by different raters using the same rating plans.
69 Lemmon, Rate Administration and Agents, Best's Fire and Casualty News, Nov. 1948, pp. 25-26.
"' CLx. INS. CODE §§i85o-i86o.3 (Supp. 1949). Montana (MONT. RlV. CODES 1947, S§40.2401-2416)
and Missouri (for casualty insurances) (Mo. REv. STAT. §§6077.x-6077.ss 1939) adopted laws patterned
on the California law.
7
'See following extract from the memorandum submitted to California Legislative joint Interim
Committee by sponsors of the bill, which was the basis for the law as eventually passed, pp. 1-2, November
12, 1946:
"'Ve believe that excessive and unnecessary regulation is not in the public interest.
Regulation which provides for specific approval for almost every act performed in developing
rates would be a costly venture for California citizens. In this regard we have a com-
parison with the State of New York where insurance legislation, similar to the All-Industry
Bill, was passed some years ago. In that state the Insurance Department budget for the year
ending March x, 1947 is $1,505,305. The cost of operation of the California Insurance
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legislation California had no rate legislation except in workmen's compensation,
and this lack of regulation had worked satisfactorily.72 A comparison of some of
the significant provisions of the respective laws will illustrate how the philosophy
of the California law differs from that of the Commissioners'--Al Industry laws.
Commissioners-All Industry Laws
Sec. I. The purpose of this Act is to
promote the public welfare by regulating
insurance rates to the end that they shall
not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly
discriminatory, and to authorize and regu-
late cooperative action among insurers in
rate making and in other matters with-
in the scope of this Act. Nothing in this
Act is intended (I) to prohibit or discour-
age reasonable competition, or (2) to pro-
hibit, or encourage except to the extent
necessary to accomplish the aforementioned
purpose, uniformity in insurance rate,
rating systems, rating plans or practices.
This Act shall be liberally interpreted to
carry into effect the provisions of this
Section.
California Law
Sec. 185o. The purpose of this chapter
is to promote the public welfare by regula-
ting insurance rates as herein provided to
the end that they shall not be excessive, in-
adequate or unfairly discriminatory, to
authorize the existence and operation of
qualified rating organizations and advisory
organizations and require that specified
rating services of such rating organizations
be generally available to all admitted in-
surers, and to authorize cooperation between
insurers in rate making and other related
matters.
It is the express intent of this chapter to
permit and encourage competition between
insurers on a sound financial basis and
nothing in this chapter is intended to give
the Commissioner power to fix and de-
termine a rate level by classification or
otherwise.
Needless to say, in a particular case this difference in the statement of purpose
might substantially influence the decision of a court in considering the propriety
of a position taken by the Commissioner in respect to a filing."a The gist of the
Commissioners'-All Industry laws is that competition is to be deprecated.
As noted under section IV, the Commissioners'--All Industry laws contain no
definitions of the terms excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. Their
content is left essentially to the discretion of the Commissioner except in so far as
other parts of the laws, including the statement of purpose quoted above, may tend
to circumscribe his discretion. Compare with this generality the definitiveness of
the California law: 74
Department for the year ending June 30, 1946 was $382,245.21.
"We cannot concur that it was ever the intent of the Congress to impose upon the
citizens of the country additional cost running into millions. It always must be remembered
that the federal and state Anti-Trust laws involve no plan for the administrative regulation
or control of a business; in fact, their very purpose is to invite the maximum of com-
petition in business, therefore the minimum of regulation. In drafting the proposal
which we submit to you we have kept that thought uppermost in our minds."
2 Sawyer, supra note 66, at 5:
"How is it that, in the State of California, where, until January i of last year there was
no regulation of rates except for workmen's compensation insurance, the insurance business,
second only in volume to the State of New York, has been regulated quite as successfully
as in New York and with, perhaps, better satisfaction to the public?"
"'See United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534 (940).
"' CAL. INS. CODE §S852 (Supp. 1949).
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(a) Rates shall not be excessive or inadequate, as herein defined, nor shall they be unfairly
discriminatory.
No rate shall be held to be excessive unless (I) such rate is unreasonably high for the
insurance provided and (2) a reasonable degree of competition does not exist in the area
with respect to the classification to which such rate is applicable.
No rate shall be held to be inadequate unless (I) such rate is unreasonably low for the
insurance provided and (2) the continued use of such rate endangers the solvency of
the insurer using the same, or unless (3) such rate is unreasonably low for the insurance
provided and the use of such rate by the insurer using same has, or if continued will
have, the effect of destroying competition, or creating a monopoly.
In keeping with its philosophy of free competition, the California law does not
require any filings to be made with the commissioner. The responsibility is left with
the bureaus and insurers to comply with the statutory standards in rating risks,
subject to the right of the commissioner to confirm such fact through making exami-
nations."
Under III B the burdensome deviation provisions of the Commissioners'-All
Industry laws were discussed. The California law, on the other hand, not only does
not require members or subscribers to adhere to the rates of their rating bureau but
it expressly prohibits them from agreeing to use such rates.
Bearing in mind that the only circumstance that precipitated the recent rating
legislation was the necessity for that portion of the industry which fixed its rates
in concert either to change its methods or obtain state regulation of its activities, it
is difficult to see why the California law is not a sufficient and excellent solution.
Those who want to get their rates from bureaus can continue their methods of
doing business, and those who want to fix their own rates can continue to do so
without incurring the cost and burdens of the filing requirements of the Com-
missioners'--All Industry laws.
VI
Tim DETAILED REGULATIONS OF Tim CoMMIssIo aS'-ALL INDUSTRY LAws An MoRE
APT TO RESULT IN FEDERAL REGULATION THAN WOULD A MINIMUM OF REGULATION
As stated in Section II, the proponents of the Commissioners'-All Industry type
of strict rate regulation identified their cause with that of "states-rights." Their
objective, among others, was to have each state pass legislation which would, they
hoped, close every possible opening through which the Federal government might
move into the field of insurance regulation. To this end, they sponsored, in addition
to the fire and casualty rating bills, a model accident and health bill and a model
fair trade practices bill. Without at all disagreeing with this objective, the question
may still be raised whether there is not more likelihood that the strict rate laws of
"Id. §1853.6 provides in part as follows: "Members and subscribers of rating or advisory
organizations may use the rates, rating systems, underwriting rules or policy or bond forms of
such organizations, either consistently or intermittently, but, except as provided in Sections 1853.5,
1853.8 and Article 5, shall not agree with each other or rating organizations or others to adhere
thereto...."
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the Commissioners'--AII Industry type will result in federal intervention than laws
such as California's which provide a maximum of insurance freedom and a mini-
mum of administrative control and expense. To the extent history is a guide, it
would seem likely that the federal government will intervene in the matter of
insurance regulation76 only if there is dissatisfaction with state regulation, either
by assureds or insurers. It is to be remembered that the SEUA indictment resulted
from an investigation that was started because of a complaint by the Attorney
General of Missouri that fire companies through their associations and bureaus were
engaging in monopolistic activities inimical to the public welfare which the states
were powerless to prevent. The recent action of the Federal Trade Commission
in entering the "mail-order" insurance field and issuing a Code of Fair Trade
Practices 78 was due, in part at least, to an invitation from certain of such companies.
It probably was due, in part, also to the fact that the problem of accident and
health mail-order insurers had been a troublesome one for years, and the states
seemed unable adequately to deal with the problem.
Under Public Law 15"0 the federal antitrust laws are still in effect in all juris-
dictions in respect to matters of coercion, intimidation, and boycott. No amount of
state regulation can prevent federal intervention, either on the part of the government
or on the part of a private litigant, within this area. It is difficult to understand why
this area of federal jurisdiction was retained, unless Congress was doubtful that
the states could adequately control such interstate combinations as the one involved
in the SEUA case. Whatever the reason, its presence will make it that much
easier for the government, in case of complaints respecting state regulation, to take
over more jurisdiction in insurance matters.
Consequently, since strict regulation of rates will, for the reasons discussed herein,
be more apt to cause dissatisfaction to the public than would a lesser degree of con-
trol such as obtains under the California law, if the states really desire to preserve
their control over interstate insurance it would seem that they would be well advised
to amend their laws accordinglyf0
The situation in respect to interstate risks formerly insured through the Interstate
Underwriters Board might be an illustration. Without entering into the controversy
as to the merits of the rating plan used by that Board, the fact does remain that in-
"' This is to be distinguished from the interest the government may have in insurance institutions
because of their concentration of wealth and economic power.7 Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. r362, 78th
Cong., ist Sess. 8o, 168, x81 (1943).
"s CCH TRaDE R G. REP. 20,268 (January 31, 195o).
1059 STAT. 33-34 (1945), 15 U. S. C. §§1osl-Ioi 5 (Supp. 1949).
" Most states have for some years required the filing and approval of life and accident and health
insurance forms. It is virtually impossible to get a form approved in all states without making special
amendments to fit the demands of particular states. This difficulty has led to the expression from time
to time by company officials that perhaps a single national authority over such matters would be pref-
erable. With the wider range and greater detail of the rating laws it would seem that such laws will
be even more likely to foster this sentiment than the policy laws.
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surances placed through it apparently were satisfactory to the assureds and to the
companies. Under the strict rate regulatory laws, the operations of this Board
were discontinued on June 30, 1948, and it has not been possible, even now, to work
out a satisfactory solution for the handling of risks formerly insured through this
Board.8 2 This has been a source of considerable dissatisfaction as well as hardship
to assureds, and doubtless also to the companies involved. Under a California type
law this problem would never have arisen.
The differences in the views of the commissioners on this problem 8 as well as on
the manufacturers' output policy mentioned under III C demonstrate what seems
to be an inescapable fact and that is that when laws such as the strict rating laws
give the commissioners authority and discretion in matters of policy and detail
and which are peculiarly the province of management there are certain to be irrec-
oncilable points of view. The result is, of necessity, frustration, because any sub-
stantial plan of insurance will involve more than one, and likely many, commis-
sioners, and unless all agree, essentially nothing can be done.
VII
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Commissioners'--All Industry laws with their burdensome
filing requirements and all-inclusive scope are not in the public interest. Even as to
companies that fix their rates in concert, the laws go beyond what was necessary
to preserve states-rights in their regulation. From the standpoint of assuring that
every rate is adequate but not excessive or unfairly discriminatory, such laws will
operate no more effectively than would laws of the California type, and so far as
preserving competition among bureau members, laws of the latter type would be
much more effective.
As to independent companies that did not and do not fix rates in concert, it is
difficult to see how any public purpose was served by subjecting them to the rigid
rate controls of the Commissioners'-All Industry laws. On the contrary, their
inclusion in these laws has played into the hands of those companies which in the
past have operated in concert and which for years have had the objective of getting
the whole industry to conform to their ideas and practices in insurance. This
objective is now accomplished with the blessing of both the State and Federal
Governments-the blessings of the states through the Commissioners'--All Industry
laws and of the Federal Government through Public Law 15. These laws cannot
but stifle competition and eliminate the facility independent companies formerly
81 Joint Hearings, supra note 77, at 425-475, 596-597.
82 Sheldon, Fire Insurance on Multiple Location Risks, INSURANCE L. J. 29 (January, 195o). The
National Underwriter, July 27, 1950, p. 5, col. I.
" Sheldon, supra note 82, at 32-33.
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had for developing new coverages, conforming standard coverages to the needs of
particular risks, and adjusting rates to the relative hazards of individual risks.
These laws will inevitably increase the costs of doing business of all insurers, and
if they are conscientiously administered, they will greatly increase the costs of main-
tamining the various state insurance departments. All such costs must be borne by the
insuring public. And for the reasons given, the public will not thereby get more
satisfactory service from the insurance industry, but the service will become pro-
gressively less satisfactory.

